This article provides a conceptual basis for ‘centering’ the relationship between artisanship and mechanization as one would in pottery making. Critical theory dichotomizes handwork from machine-work, emphasizing the division between non-alienated and alienated labor, authenticity and inauthenticity, and experiential resonance and capitalist fetishism. The author demonstrates the theoretical shortcomings and social repercussions of these dualisms through a study of Onta, a Japanese pottery village associated with the mingei folkcraft movement. Tied to ideals of cultural authenticity predicated on the refusal to mechanize, Onta’s reputation came into question during the ‘Problem of Mechanization’ debate, when craftspeople announced a request to introduce modern machinery into their craft making patterns. Reflecting on the ways artisanal and industrial technologies have been imagined, this article poses the question: Do certain mechanical systems exert too much force to enter into centered relationships with humans?
Journal of Material Culture 2017
True human integrity is not a given, it is a conquest. We are not born one, but multiple. And most people, throughout their lives, continue to manifest various traits of character, often contradictory or in any case disparate, mal-unified. Integrity is the virtue of the one who has made and continues to make the effort to be coherent, and to harmonize one’s tendencies into a whole whose purity is close to what Nietzsche called the self as a work of art: a personal symphony.
Sometimes we speak of a person of integrity as someone a little rigid and privileging morality at the detriment of personal pleasure. There’s something of Clint Eastwood’s character in the person of integrity. Hence the difficulty of most cheap enjoyers, open to easy gratification, to imagine themselves honest. The Latin root of the word integrity suggests a person or thing that has not been tampered with, that has remained intact, pure. But true integrity does not follow a Puritan morality imposed from the outside: it is rather a respect and desire for oneself, a conformity of oneself to oneself, a dynamic of integration of our existential drafts in successive and more homogeneous versions of ourselves. It is sometimes said that it must be boring to be a person of integrity. But what is more boring: the conquering pain of worthy maturation or spending days stumbling over multiple versions of oneself bickering to take the reins of the ego? By dint of wanting to be a little everything and everywhere, we are rarely grandiose and finally we do not enjoy life as much as we expected. One might wake up one day, late, filled with holes, stained by mediocrity and self-denial, with a taste of old chewing gum in the mouth.
The idea of integrity and the ethical idea of adulthood have much in common, if we accept the fact that being an adult is not only a question of age but of heroism. To become one and powerfully serene, it is necessary to give away certain aspects that we had identified as personal. Most people cultivate too many contradictory tendencies without privileging a dominant facet. Becoming one without becoming dull is an art of virtuosity that goes through some pain, but a chosen pain, sublime, and in fact joyful. It is of course important not to feel guilty about our contradictions, nor to try to overcome them too quickly or too violently: they are natural – after all we are the children of the Creal, the multiple and the possible. But it is also profitable for an admirable life to eliminate as many conflicting tendencies as possible. The question then is: What facet of my personal experience should I choose to be a person of integrity? Who am I?
Too many people, without renouncing integrity, tend to postpone becoming one, for fear of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. They would like to be more coherent, more faithful to themselves, but have no idea of the principles of this higher self. Integrity begins with the desire to be honest. Becoming oneself is every day discovering a territory that expands, with trees that we had not imagined, unexpected creatures, activities that we would not have thought we would embrace, and other concretizations of our fidelity to values or beliefs that one embodies better — that is to say durably — if one becomes aware of them.
Integrity is a puzzle of principles, with a centerpiece in the center, the principle of principles drawn by the sum of the secondary principles. It is rare to find directly the principle of principles that governs the highest version of oneself. But we can sketch its figure little by little, keeping the pieces of the puzzle that seem right, harmonious with our intuitive music. Integrity is not only difficult to achieve because we do not have enough pieces to make the right puzzle: it is complex because we have too many pieces, and we spend too much time trying indolently to make a puzzle from pieces that never interlock.
To create is also to eliminate. Richness will later return, more persistent, more unheard of, more intense, after a phase of voluntary — firm but loving — depletion.
The paragraphs below are excerpted from the manuscript of my forthcoming book, The Transnational Genealogy of Esprit de Corps (Edinburgh University Press). This is a draft, especially the English translation of Bergson’s quotations, which I am working on at the moment.
Henri Bergson was a world-famous philosopher in the early decades of the twentieth century. He was known for his concepts of creation and life, but esprit de corps became a fundamental notion in his last major book, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion,where it appeared closely related to the idea that one’s social self was like a ‘superior self’ [‘moi supérieur’]:’
<EXT>If we accept the idea of […] a ‘primitive mentality’, in it self-respect will coincide with the feeling of such solidarity between the individual and the group that the group remains constantly present to the isolated individual, oversees him, encourages or threatens him, eventually demands to be consulted and obeyed […]. The pressure of the social self is exerted via accumulation of these individual energies. Moreover, the individual obeys not only by habit of discipline or by fear of punishment: the group to which he belongs necessarily puts itself above the others, […] and the consciousness of this superiority of force assures […] all the pleasures of pride. […] It suffices to observe what happens before our eyes in small societies that are constituted within the greater society, when men are brought closer to each other by some distinctive mark which underlines a real or apparent superiority, and who sets them apart. […] All the members of the group ‘hold’ each other; we observe the birth of a ‘feeling of honour’ that is identical to esprit de corps.</EXT>
Bergson seemed to present here a synthesis of the ideas of authors like Durkheim, Tarde, Palante, or Terraillon: esprit de corps was a tribal process of collective self-glorification. But Bergson’s use of inverted commas was probably connected to the fact that for him, this ‘feeling of honour’ was not true or natural, but rather a necessary fiction, a ‘fabulation’.
Fabulation was a cognitive capacity to manipulate symbols and fictional narratives in order to generate common beliefs. It functioned like a form of ‘virtual instinct’:
<EXT>It can be called a virtual instinct, because at the extremity of another line of evolution, in insect societies, we see instinct provoking a mechanical conduct comparable in its usefulness to the one that is induced, in the intelligent and free mind of man, by quasi-hallucinatory images.</EXT>
In Latin, fabulari meant to speak and invent a story. Bergson suggested that language, ideology and storytelling could help to create a mindset, a second nature, that simulated animal instinct to a certain extent. Esprit de corps was a form of collective hallucination, a contagious social fiction, a more or less permanent altered state of consciousness. This would justify the use of the term esprit as a form of spiritual possession. The apparent paradox here was that freedom and intelligence were interlaced with illusion and insect-like instinct. How could one be free and at the same time hallucinating? How could one be intelligent and model one’s conduct on a fable?
The answer, according to Bergson, lay in our plastic capacity to recreate new ideologies, to modify our narratives, to regularly redesign our evolving virtual instinct, to which we then gave our near-blind consent for a period of time, for the sake of social utility and mutual effectuality. Not unlike others before him, but more systematically, Bergson distinguished two interdependent and dialectical modes of human solidarity, one more conservative, the other more creative. It was the first one, based on obligation and social pressure, that was comparable with the instinct of eusocial animals like ants and bees. It formed in human societies an effective second nature via ‘habitude’, language, and social fictions. In this case, the cohesion of the group was also maintained through its opposition to an outside territory, an outgroup. It was, when ripe, a circular force, hostile to the new:
<EXT>Between the society we live in and humanity in general there is […] the same contrast as between the closed and the open. […] Anyone can understand that social cohesion is due in large part to a society’s necessity to defend itself against others, and that it is first against all the other men that one loves the men with whom he lives?</EXT>
In other words, esprit de caste and antagonism between groups was inevitable. But a more creative form of esprit de corps existed, if ephemerally; one that was about love and openness for mankind rather than agonism.
Bergson thought that the mortar that joined the bricks of a closed society was ‘discipline’, which prepared for an ‘attitude’ of ‘war’ in front of an ‘enemy’, a defensive mindset that subsisted even when covered by the ‘varnish’ of ‘moral duty’. There was a collective pressure on the members to remain united in a hermetic corps and surrender part of their individuality to the obligations and discipline of the in-group, for the sake of battles won. But because life was dual, both structured and structuring, both spiritual and natural, because it was a process of ‘creative evolution’, human societies, according to Bergson, also manifested a meta-historical flow of sentimental universalism, a slow and widening feeling of unity and solidarity that kept creating renewed and larger, more encompassing fabulations. This second tendency, representative of our cosmic freedom, was often manifested in spiritual figures who were at the forefront of the momentum of life [‘élan de vie.’] Life evolves towards the ‘ideal limit’ of a ‘mystical society that would encompass the whole of humanity’:
<EXT>Privileged souls arose who felt akin to all souls and who, instead of remaining within the limits of the group and sticking to the solidarity established by nature, moved towards humanity in general in a spirit of love. The appearance of each of them was like the creation of a new species composed of a single individual, the vital thrust arriving once in a while, in a determined man, at a result which could not have been attained immediately by the whole of humanity.</EXT>
The mystical hero, a mutant of sorts, was the key to the evolution of humanity. Nature is antagonistic and closed, while life is openness to a spiritual dimension, deeper and freer than instinct. Universalism and particularism, love and war, were for Bergson a process of dialectical humanism that slowly aspired towards a cosmopolitan form of solidarity, even if it was constantly limited by specific manifestations and norms. The pression of basic instinct was slowly overflowed by the aspiration of life, a virtual instinct that was more plastic, not completely solid or automatic, but rather carrying the energy of life as cosmic creative flow. This energy was incarnated by rare role-model figures that kept re-inventing humanity.
For Bergson, not unlike Durkheim or Palante, esprit de corps was not only a societal notion but also a biological one: ‘Any morality, of pressure or aspiration, is of biological essence.’ But Bergson’s biology was holistic rather than reductionist. For him the flow of life was a spiritual creative flow, a dilation, an expansive aspiration towards the creation of new forms of society and intelligence, a movement that was regularly obstructed but never stopped by matter, reality contracted into the robustness, solidity and solidarity of collective niches, but never totally rigidified because of the underground momentum of life. Our existence is driven by this double dynamic movement of, on the one hand, ‘dilatation’ and springing (inspiration, esprit), and ‘contraction’, solidification by ordering (incorporation, corps) on the other hand. Esprit de corps is for Bergson the very dialectic of life, reflecting the original cosmic dynamic duality between the multiple and One, creation and unification.
There is such a dialectic at work in human social processes: one movement is of creation and aspiration towards freedom, the other regulates the preservation of individuals into safer cohesive groups. To achieve the latter, a simulated instinct was often more efficient than intelligence: ‘Intelligence would be an obstacle to serenity.’ The reduction of the unpredictable was the practical aim of esprit de corps as second nature: it had to somewhat contradict the impetus of creative evolution.
Henri Bergson, Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990 ).
Ibid. p. 65.
‘Si l’on admet […] une ‘mentalité primitive’, on y verra le respect de soi coïncider avec le sentiment d’une telle solidarité entre l’individu et le groupe que le groupe reste présent à l’individu isolé, le surveille, l’encourage ou le menace, exige enfin d’être consulté et obéi […]. La pression du moi social s’exerce avec toutes ces énergies accumulées. L’individu n’obéit d’ailleurs pas seulement par habitude de la discipline ou par crainte du châtiment : le groupe auquel il appartient se met nécessairement au-dessus des autres, […] et la conscience de cette supériorité de force lui assure […] toutes les jouissances de l’orgueil. […] Il suffit d’observer ce qui se passe sous nos yeux dans les petites sociétés qui se constituent au sein de la grande, quand des hommes se trouvent rapprochés les uns des autres par quelque marque distinctive qui souligne une supériorité réelle ou apparente, et qui les met à part. […] Tous les membres du groupe ‘se tiennent’ ; on voit naître un ‘sentiment de l’honneur’ qui ne fait qu’un avec l’esprit de corps.’ Bergson, Les deux sources, p. 66–7.
Ibid., p. 111.
‘C’est de l’instinct virtuel, entendant par là qu’à l’extrémité d’une autre ligne d’évolution, dans les sociétés d’insectes, nous voyons l’instinct provoquer mécaniquement une conduite comparable, pour son utilité, à celle que suggèrent à l’homme, intelligent et libre, des images quasi hallucinatoires.’ Ibid., p. 114.
‘Fabuler’, Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, <www.cnrlt.fr>.
Bergson, Les deux sources, p. 23.
‘Entre la société où nous vivons et l’humanité en général il y a […] le même contraste qu’entre le clos et l’ouvert. […] Qui ne voit que la cohésion sociale est due, en grande partie, à la nécessité pour une société de se défendre contre d’autres, et que c’est d’abord contre tous les autres hommes qu’on aime les hommes avec lesquels on vit ?’ Ibid., p. 27.
Bergson, Les deux sources, p. 27.
Bergson, L’évolution créatrice(Paris, Alcan, 1907).
Bergson, Les deux sources, p. 56.
‘société mystique qui engloberait l’humanité entière’ Ibid.,p. 85.
‘Des âmes privilégiées ont surgi qui se sentaient apparentées à toutes les âmes et qui, au lieu de rester dans les limites du groupe et de s’en tenir à la solidarité établie par la nature, se portaient vers l’humanité en général dans un élan d’amour. L’apparition de chacune d’elles était comme la création d’une espèce nouvelle composée d’un individu unique, la poussée vitale aboutissant de loin en loin, dans un homme déterminé, à un résultat qui n’eût pu être obtenu tout d’un coup pour l’ensemble de l’humanité.’ Ibid., p. 97.
‘Toute morale, pression ou aspiration, est d’essence biologique.’Bergson,Les deux sources, p. 103.
Bergson, L’évolution créatrice, pp. 46–149.
‘L’intelligence serait un obstacle à la sérénité.’ Bergson,Les deux sources, p. 219.
Ibid., p. 147.
‘Des exercices continuellement répétés sont nécessaires, comme ceux dont l’automatisme finit par fixer dans le corps du soldat l’assurance morale dont il aura besoin au jour du danger.’ Ibid., p. 212.
There is a relationship between physicalism and anticipation, according to Burgers (1975). Physicalist descriptions usually follow the causality principle. Causality is a certain discourse according to which “objective facts” from the past affect an objective present state of affairs. “It is in this way that the ‘past’—that is, those aspects of past phenomena which are amenable to measurement—has come to appear as the ‘cause’ of the present. It is a concise statement summarizing the accumulated experience obtained by observing the behavior of nonliving bodies and systems, collected since the beginning of modern science.” (p. 194) To be fair, science does not claim to be able to predict all facts from the past and future: it claims less ambitiously that in order to predict certain physical states of material objects, we can look at some anterior similar properties of the system.
Causality is not the only mode of transmission between two realities. Moreover, humans apply metaphors of causality on a daily basis to their subjective experience: “She left him because he did not love her” is a sentence that seems to express a causal relation. Yet if we compare it to a sentence like: “The ball fell because she did not catch it”, we exemplify that causality itself is always far more complex than intended. The very idea of causality might have evolutionarily emerged from the mind’s desire to reduce complexity. In other words, there is a desire for clarity and actuality that causes causal explanations as operational narratives. If we focus on the material patterns that explain processes, we forget the original intention to understand, clarify and anticipate, which nevertheless was the motivation for a causal discourse.
Burgers adds: “There is no justification for enforcing this concept of causality on the entire Universe as the only possible form of relationship.” He notes that our experience of life is that of a temporal continuity between what happened and what did not happen yet. The search for causes is possible because we anticipate that a solution is possible, and such anticipation is possible because we reasonably trust the fact that we will still be here in the near future. “In our thoughts, in our feelings and actions there is not only a reminiscence of past events, but also a notion that we shall exist—that is, that we shall be open to experience and shall act—in the next instant and probably in the next after that, and so on. Even when one is aware of acute danger for one’s life, this is an expectation concerning the future.” (p 195)
Let’s consider the desire to eliminate uncertainty and reduce complexity. That desire itself is probably complex, enmeshed in a series of micro-desires—as in Leibniz’s micro-perceptions. Burgers notes that the fact that feelings and desires are usually left apart in physical and biological explanations is unsatisfactory. Living beings make “extrapolations”, not only about the future but also about the present and the past. This might be because the ultimate “motivation” of a living being is to generate “extensions of potentialities for action.” The problem with such an explanation is that is seems to presuppose innumerable forms of local will at work, cognitive if unconscious intentionalities constantly negotiating with each other. But if such a thing as will exists in the universe, how can it be quantitatively divided into subjective wills, your will, my will, the cat’s will, without being negated? The fact that ego can happen to be the negation of will is a paradox often debated in the history of psychoanalysis. If will emerges from individual beings, we would have to explain how localized matter can generate will, and in the end, we would probably need to presuppose a form of universal will if we don’t want to claim something problematic like: “This particular assemblage of atoms started to have a will as a part of their system.” Here we could look at Spinoza’s pantheism for further exploration.
I don’t believe we need to put too much emphasis on will. Burgers cannot imagine that determinism and what he calls “freedom”—which he equates with choice—can be one and the same aspect of the same process. But if we accept the hypothesis according to which “extensions of potentialities” is the state by default of the universe, that the primum mobile or first cause of all material causalities and realities is a creative and desiring Real, a Creal, an infinite and continuously dynamic soup of potentialities, then there cannot be such thing as zero potentialities for action apart as an idea. Even a dead body contains numerous potentialities for actualization, decomposition and recomposition, although these actions might not be perceived by the consciousness that once occupied the body. An actuality for a given reality is a potentiality for a not yet given reality.
The feeling of anticipation is the feeling of the Creal: potentialities that call for actualizations. Subjective wills are local manifestations of a universal will which is not really a will, rather an aspiration generated in all microcosms by their participation to the Creal hypercosm—and its double, the One. The dynamic and asymptotic horizon of a realm of potentialities is Unity, because Oneness is the primal condition for actualization. The dynamic and asymptotic horizon of a realm of actualities is Multiplicity, because Disparateness is the primal condition for potentiality.
This was a loose reading of the first 2 pages of the following article:
Burgers, J. M. (1975). Causality and Anticipation. Science, vol. 189, No. 4198, pp. 194-198.
To be continued…
Human existence, as possibility and ongoing project (Sartre, 1956), is the anticipation, the expectation, the sentiment of what will be. The future is our fundamental existential dimension (Heidegger, 1962). Existence is always stretched out towards the possible of a horizon that death renders elastic. To attempt to escape the anguish felt before the power of a future that is our responsibility, we tend to apply a form of bad faith that transforms the future into an object, a determined thing that is happening without our consent. Today a dominant figure of this objectified future is Artificial Intelligence, a.k.a AI.
An ironical mise en abyme makes this moment of our technological destiny particularly significant: as an industrial tool, artificial intelligence is itself more and more used as a predictive, prescriptive and anticipatory media. AI is not only the fetishized future that allows us to surrender our responsibility, but it is also an objectifying tool itself, transforming uncertainty into probabilities and patterns into certainties. In anticipating an automated future, humans are attempting to automate anticipation itself. Rather than simply distinguishing what is fairer or less chocking in terms of choice between several objectified futures, the ethics of automation must question our nihilism, the subject’s “passion of abolition” or “great disgust” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).
The disgust or discouragement of being human is one of the blind spots of our ethics of machine intelligence. Appeals to a human-centric and more humane technology are today unanimous, leaving a taboo in its shade in the form of murmured questions: are we humans, so much better than machines? Are machines not our other, because of our tendency to act in autopilot mode evidenced by psychology (Raichle et al, 2001). Worse, are machines not better than us? They don’t lie, they don’t kill, they don’t betray, they don’t get sick, and technology itself never gets old or vulnerable (only its applications do) since it is today the realm of the new. To cure ourselves from such nihilistic temptations, we need understand anew that being human-centric should not amount to a list of objective qualities that humans would have, because if any quality could be objectified then it could possibly be quantified, simulated or automated. Being human-centric can only mean, in the existentialist sense: open to the conscious subject as pure possibility of creation. Open to the Creal.
What the ethics of automation are about is this revelation and actualization of the subject as openness to creation, responsibility and freedom as personal initiative rather than choice between objectified and quantified options. In this sense, extensive automation, as the one permitted by AI can in fact be a global existential opportunity for humanity.
By revealing our future illiteracy (Miller, 2018) and vulnerability to objectification in terms of future predictions and data analysis, anticipatory media also puts us in front of the responsibility of our freedom, by suggesting we question once more the notion of personal initiative. Hyper-prediction and artificial anticipatory intelligence could mean the end of personal initiative, if automatic decisions and analytic prescriptions become part of our everyday experience. But precisely by placing the phenomenon of personal initiative under high pressure and menace, artificial intelligence might liberate human active intelligence at last. In the 21st century, humanity will need to choose between a) achieving total smoothness as in any dystopian novel in the manner of Brave New World (Huxley, 1932) and b) preserving roughness (Wittgenstein, 1953). Artificial intelligence and automation are very good at smoothing the world, eliminating complications, noise, favoring flow, effectivity, and creating user-friendly experiences: “We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk, so we need friction. Back to the rough ground.” (Wittgenstein, 1953, §107).
Delegating the care for the future to machines in the form of analytic prediction and data-based prescription is tempting, but in the end it manifests the illusion of a non-mediated existence, one of pure smoothness: a world of inertia.
Deleuze, G. and Félix Guattari (1987). A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and Time. New York: Harper & Row.
Huxley, A. (1932) Brave New World. London: Chatto & Windus
Miller, R. (2018), Transforming the Future: Anticipation in the 21st century. London: Routledge.
Raichle, M. E. (2001), et al. “A Default Mode of Brain Function”, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 98 (2).
Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and nothingness. Oxford, England: Philosophical Library.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Gabriel Schreiber & Roberto Umansky
The mathematical theory of bifurcation originated in the seminal work of Henri Poincaré on systems of non-linear differential equations. The term bifurcation was coined by Poincaré to designate the emergence of several solutions from a given solution. Whenever the solution to an equation, or system of equations, changes qualitatively at a fixed value of a parameter, called a critical value, the phenomenon is called a bifurcation. The point in the parameter space where such an event occurs is defined a bifurcation point. From a bifurcation point several stable or unstable solution branches emerge. Successive bifurcations lead to an irregular and unpredictable time evolution of deterministic nonlinear systems, which is designated chaos. The unique character of chaotic dynamics is their sensitivity to initial conditions as described by Poincaré:
“It may happen that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena. A small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter. Prediction becomes impossible, and we have the fortuitous phenomenon” (397).
If prediction becomes impossible, it is evident that a chaotic system can resemble a stochastic system (a system subject to random external forces). However, the source of the irregularity is quite different. For chaos, the irregularity is part of the intrinsic dynamics of the system, rather than unpredictable outside influences. Chaos enables determinism and unpredictability to coexist in the same system. Moreover, surprisingly, a very well defined universal route, which leads from order to chaos, was discovered by Mitchell Feigenbaum. There are abrupt qualitative changes: ordered successive bifurca- tions, which mark a universally ordered transition from order to chaos: Feigenbaum’s universality. The idea of bifurcation is central to contemporary physical theories of irreversible, far-from equilibrium thermodynamics. The contributions of Prigogine’s Brussels School (Prigogine, Prigogine & Stengers) in this regard are of prime importance, showing that bifurcations under far-from-equilibrium conditions constitute the natural mechanism of evolution and of acquisition of complexity.
With a sense of derealization, it may seem strange to the reader that this text has fallen into a journal on literature. What has it to do with literature? What has it to do with Borges? We may be reminded by the metaphysicians of Tlön who “Judge that metaphysics is a branch of the literature of fantasy”. Borges once claimed that the basic devises of all fantastic literature are only four in number: the work within a work, the contamination of reality by dream, the voyage in time, and the double (Irby xviii).
Analysis of the concept of anticipation can contribute to the philosophy of biology. J. M. Burgers
“The purpose of this article is to renew discussion of the problem whether the phe- nomena of life can be satisfactorily ana- lyzed and explained on the basis of the laws discovered in the physical sciences, or whether more is needed. When mentioning the physical sciences, I have in mind the physical laws as they are formulated at present, with the trend of thinking that forms their present background. Otherwise the problem would become indefinite. I wish to consider the thesis that the features of life involve relations not covered by the present formulation of the physical laws, relations which, although not amenable to quantitative analysis, nevertheless play a decisive part in many reactions of living organisms. The problem is, on one hand, how to put this in appropriate terms, and on the other, to analyze some con- sequences of the thesis. It is useful to start with a brief recapitulation of what may be called the central doctrine of the laws of physics, namely the idea of causal relation- ship. This will be given in the next section. The principal argument concerning the need for extension to another form of rela- tionship is presented in the third section of the article. It is taken from features of our human mental life.”
Causality and Anticipation
Author(s): J. M. Burgers
Source: Science, New Series, Vol. 189, No. 4198 (Jul. 18, 1975), pp. 194-198
Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science